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SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 Appellant Ferenc Koreh appeals from the district 
court's order granting summary judgment to the United States on 
three counts of its complaint revoking Koreh's naturalization and 
requiring the return of his certificate of naturalization.  The 
United States based its lawsuit on conduct by defendant of a 
different order than the direct involvement in physical 
atrocities that has characterized many other denaturalization 
cases.  The legal principles, nonetheless, are equally 
applicable. 
 I. 
 Facts and Procedural History  
 Koreh was born on September 4, 1909 in Sepsimagyaros, 
Northern Transylvania, an area that moved between Romania and 
Hungary but which was part of Hungary in 1940, when most of the 
events relevant to this case began.  As did the district court we 
rely only on facts that the parties do not dispute.1  Because the 
relevant facts are set forth in detail in the district court's 
comprehensive published opinion, see United States v. Koreh, 856 
F. Supp. 891 (D. N.J. 1994), we repeat only those essential to 
our holding. 
                     
1
.  At the summary judgment stage a court must give the benefit 
of all inferences to the non-moving party.  See Erie Telecomms., 
Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).  In 
order to determine which material facts are not in dispute, this 
court conducts an independent review of the record.  See Bechtel 
  
 Hungary was the site of virulent anti-Semitism during 
the late 1930s and early 1940s.  In 1938, shortly after Nazi 
Germany annexed Austria and established a common border with 
Hungary, the Hungarian Parliament passed its first major piece of 
anti-Semitic legislation.  See Act No. XV of 1938 To More 
Effectively Safeguard the Balance of Social and Economic Life, 
Budapesti Közlöny, May 29, 1938, at 132-44; App. at 1620-52.  The 
legislation limited the proportion of Jews that could be employed 
in the free professions (e.g. law, journalism, and the arts) and 
in business enterprises with ten or more employees.  Id. at §§ 4, 
7-8; App. at 1622-24.  This legislation was followed in 1939 by a 
second law that attempted to define "Jewishness" in racial terms 
and implemented further social and economic restrictions upon 
Hungarian Jews.  See Act No. IV of 1939 Concerning Limitations on 
the Economic and Political Expansion of Jews; App. at 1653-1706.  
This law prevented Jews from obtaining Hungarian citizenship, 
barred them from serving in public offices or holding significant 
positions in the press, and further reduced the proportion of 
Jews that could be employed in Hungarian businesses.  Id. at §§ 
3-21; App. at 1657-69. 
 In September 1940, as a result of an agreement between 
Hungary and Romania, Hungary annexed Northern Transylvania.  
(..continued) 
v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1989).  Of course, a 
defendant's attempt to characterize undisputed facts or to put 




Immediately after the annexation, the anti-Semitic legislation 
that had been previously enacted by the Hungarian Parliament was 
applied to the approximately 164,000 Jews living in Northern 
Transylvania.  Under Hungarian law at the time, no newspaper 
could publish without a government license.  App. at 435.  In the 
fall of 1940, Koreh applied for and received a license from the 
Hungarian Prime Minister's office to publish Szekely Nep, a 
private daily newspaper in Northern Transylvania.   
 After obtaining the license, Koreh became the 
"Responsible Editor" of Szekely Nep.  The parties agree that 
Koreh served as Responsible Editor at Szekely Nep from January 
18, 1941 to April 19, 1942; from approximately August 1, 1942 to 
August 29, 1942; and from October 24, 1942 to October 28, 1942.2   
There is no dispute that during these periods, approximately 
fifty-five anti-Semitic and/or anti-Allies articles appeared in 
the pages of Szekely Nep.  Fifty-one of those articles were 
unsigned. 
 Koreh has admitted that he was aware that the paper had 
to demonstrate an anti-Semitic profile to please the Germans and 
the Hungarian government.  Although Koreh's byline appeared on 
some of the anti-Semitic articles and the government produced 
evidence of his extensive involvement in editorial decisions, 
                     
2
.  Although Koreh held the position until November 1944, he 
contends that his tenure did not include the periods between 
these intervals or extend beyond October 28, 1942, and we will so 
assume for the purposes of this appeal.   
  
referred to by the district court, Koreh disputes the 
government's contentions that his duties included writing, 
reading, editing and reviewing the paper's contents.  At oral 
argument, counsel clarified Koreh's position as asserting that he 
wrote articles but not the anti-Semitic articles.  For the 
purposes of summary judgment, the government accepts that Koreh 
did not write or edit any of these articles.  There is no 
question, however, that the person holding the position of 
Responsible Editor on the masthead was criminally and civilly 
liable for all unsigned articles and for those for which the 
author was unavailable.3  Moreover, Koreh concedes that he served 
as an emissary between the paper and the government.   
 His testimony at deposition was as follows:  
 Q: Well, besides getting the license, then what did 
you do at Szekely Nep? 
 
                     
3
.  The government contends Koreh told the staff what political 
direction the paper should take and what they could and could not 
publish.  Although in his deposition Koreh made numerous 
statements suggesting that he did have input into the paper's 
editorial content, see App. at 735 (Q:  You had to insure the 
political contents of the paper; is that correct?  A:  Yes, you 
can say so.), 738-39 (Q:  How did you communicate; you just said 
you told people what they could and couldn't publish, didn't you?  
You are nodding, yes? . . . .  Let the record reflect that Mr. 
Koreh is nodding affirmatively.), at other points in his 
deposition he minimized his involvement in the paper's editorial 
policies.  See App. at 713, 722, 726-27.  The government's expert 
evidence regarding the typical role of Responsible Editors in 
Hungary may provide a basis to challenge Koreh's credibility on 
this point, but such credibility determinations are inappropriate 
at the summary judgment stage.  See Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 
825, 835 (3d Cir. 1994).  For purposes of this appeal, we will 
therefore assume that Koreh's input into the editorial process at 
the newspaper was minimal. 
  
 A: Not too much. 
 
 Q: My question -- 
 
 A: I was first man there, you know. 
 
 Q: What does that mean, you were first man there? 
 
 A: I was representing here and there. I went up to 
Budapest, I talked with politicians, with 
ministers, you know, about things how to behave, 
what to do, what kinds of articles they thought 
were useful, and so on, so, but I did not stay 
there, you know, to make the paper every day. 
   
 Q: Are you saying that you were the person that the 
government told [what] had to be in the paper? 
 
 A: No, but anyhow I talked very much with 
politicians, with other newspapermen, and about 
the whole situation. . . . 
 
 Q: So you discussed political issues with people in 
Budapest? 
 
 A: Certainly. 
 
 Q: And you discussed articles that should appear in 
Szekely Nep in Budapest? 
 
 A: No, we didn't discuss that. 
 
     See App. at 721-22 (emphasis added). 
 
 
    Koreh does not challenge the characterizations of these 
fifty-five articles as either "anti-Semitic" or "anti-Allies," 
nor could he, as made clear by an objective review of the 
unsigned articles appearing in Szekely Nep during the period for 
which Koreh was legally accountable for them to the Hungarian 
government.  See, e.g., App. at 1141 (Oct. 2, 1941: emphasizing 
the "alien-character" of the Jews in Hungary); App. at 1140 
  
(Oct. 2, 1941: discussing "the Jewish question" in Hungary); App. 
at 1143 (Oct. 2, 1941: quoting a German publication which stated 
that "a final solution may be achieved only by deporting Jewish 
elements"); App. at 1190 (Oct. 31, 1941: referring to the works 
of Jewish writers as "highly undesirable 'literature'"); App. at 
1312 (Jan. 29, 1942: stating that "Jews must not be permitted to 
plunder the people"); App. at 1473 (Aug. 12, 1942: referring to 
Jews as "the enemies of our race, who have stampeded over our 
bodies and continue to do so in their merciless plan to destroy 
Hungarians"); App. at 1416 (Apr. 11, 1942: "There are still 
others who say that we should not have harmed the Jews, but thank 
God, today we are beyond these types of sentimentality"); App. at 
1515 (Aug. 29, 1942: attacking the author of a book questioning 
Hungarian anti-Jewish laws, and noting that the author "is 
certainly unaware of that part of the Holy Scriptures in which 
Jesus, the Lord, regarded Jewry not as his own race, but as a 
'brood of vipers'"). 
 Many of the articles published by Szekely Nep combined 
this anti-Semitic sentiment with anti-Allies rhetoric regarding 
World War II.  See, e.g., App. at 1085 (July 24, 1941: discussing 
the "New York Jewish plan" to destroy Germany); App. at 1320 
(Jan. 31, 1942: "The Role of Jewish Capital in the Present World 
War"); App. at 1328-30 (Feb. 15, 1942: article entitled "How the 
World's Jews Forced the American People to Go to War," which 
argued that "it was exclusively Jews who, by an irresponsible 
  
representation of the facts, have incited the American people to 
wage war against Japan"); App. at 1330 (Feb. 15, 1942: referring 
to "President Roosevelt and the Jewish clique behind him," and 
stating that "the Jews believe that they, as 'the chosen people,' 
are destined to rule over all the other peoples of the earth, and 
therefore they are willing to use any means to achieve this 
end"); App. at 1321 (Jan. 31, 1942: discussing an alleged plan 
for "Jewish world hegemony"); App at 1353 (Mar. 18, 1942: 
"Washington, London and Moscow are waging a war in order to 
establish Jewish world domination"). 
 In addition, Szekely Nep frequently coupled its strong 
anti-Semitic tone with statements supporting or encouraging the 
Hungarian government's steps to enact or to enforce various anti-
Jewish measures.  See, e.g., App. at 1402 (Apr. 9, 1942: 
demanding that the Hungarian government "send the Jews packing 
from the homes they continue to arrogantly occupy even today"); 
App. at 1115 (Aug. 29, 1941: "[I]n particular in the field of 
commerce, we strive to permit the Jews the smallest possible room 
to act, and to encourage Hungarian commerce to expand"); App. at 
1416-17 (Apr. 11, 1942: calling for stricter rules against Jews 
"in the areas of housing and purchasing"); App. at 1472 (Aug. 12, 
1942: calling for the "purification" of Hungarians through 
stricter enforcement of laws against those who serve as front men 
for Jewish business owners); App. at 1486 (Aug. 14, 1942: 
referring to Jews as "elements harboring alien interests and 
  
driven by the desire of self-enrichment," and calling for legal 
reform); App. at 1492 (Aug. 20, 1942: blaming Jews for the 
overcrowding on trains and buses and applauding efforts taken by 
the government to limit Jewish use of sleeping cars). 
 In April 1941, the Hungarian Government enacted a 
decree requiring all Jewish males to serve in a Forced Labor 
Service to assist the Hungarian Army.  The implementation of that 
decree between 1941 and 1944 led to the deaths of many Hungarian 
Jews who were forced to work behind Hungarian lines on the 
Eastern Front.  Also in 1941, Hungary ordered and implemented a 
decree resulting in the deportation of between 17,000 and 18,000 
Jews who were deemed "foreign" by the Hungarian government 
because they could not prove their Hungarian citizenship.  These 
"foreign" Jews, many of whom were from Northern Transylvania, 
were deported to German-occupied Ukraine, where they were placed 
in the custody of members of the German Schutzstaffel ("SS") and 
subsequently executed.   
 In August 1941, the Hungarian Government enacted 
legislation copied from the Nazis barring marriages and sexual 
relations between Jews and non-Jews.  See Act No. XV of 1941, 
Amending and Protecting the Matrimony Act; App. at 1707-38.  The 
law contained provisions attempting to define Jewishness, and 
included criminal penalties to be applied to the participants and 
to any officials who oversaw such marriages.   
  
 In 1943, Koreh moved to Budapest and began working in 
the Royal Hungarian Ministry of National Defense and Propaganda.  
Koreh has admitted that he served as an officer in the 
Information Section of the Ministry in 1943 and 1944.  See App. 
at 189, 345, 358.  The Information Section was responsible for 
"monitoring of the country's public opinion and provision of 
accurate and objective information concerning matters of national 
interest to organizations and institutions which have a formative 
influence on public opinion."  App. at 1590. 
 In March 1944, Nazi Germany occupied Hungary.  Shortly 
thereafter, more than one hundred decrees related to Hungarian 
Jews were issued.  These decrees included orders confiscating 
Jewish property, relocating Jews to ghettos, restricting Jewish 
movement and barring Jews from using public services.  Finally, 
beginning in May 1944, the government began mass deportation of 
Hungarian Jews to German labor and concentration camps.  Between 
May 1944 and July 8, 1944, approximately 435,000 Hungarian Jews 
were deported to Auschwitz death camp and other German labor and 
concentration camps. 
 After the German occupation of Hungary, Koreh assumed 
the role of Responsible Editor of the government-owned periodical 
Világlap.  Koreh's responsibilities at Világlap included review 
of photographs and articles selected for publication and 
supervision of the editorial staff.  In 1947, several years after 
the war ended, Koreh was convicted of a war crime for his role as 
  
a Responsible Editor of Világlap by the People's Court of 
Hungary, and served seven months of his one-year sentence for the 
conviction in prison.4  In addition, he also spent additional 
time thereafter in a detention camp. 
 In 1950, Koreh applied for and received a visa to the 
United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. 
No. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as amended by Pub. L. 
No. 81-555, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950) (the "DPA").  In 
connection with his application, Koreh signed an affidavit 
stating that he had never been a member of or participated in any 
movement which is or has been hostile to the United States, and 
that he had never advocated or assisted in the persecution of any 
person because of race, religion or national origin.  That 
affidavit was a prerequisite to the issuance of the visa and it 
is those facts that the government has challenged in this 
lawsuit.   
 On March 8, 1956, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York granted Koreh's petition for 
naturalization and issued to him Certificate of Naturalization 
No. 7516480.  In the ensuing years, Koreh has lived in the United 
States, where he has worked as a writer, translator and 
broadcaster for Radio Free Europe.  Koreh has also served as an 
                     
4
.  Koreh moved to expand the record in this court with material 
allegedly showing that conviction was recently overturned by the 
post-Communist government in Hungary, but because Koreh withdrew 
his motion after government objection we have no evidentiary 
basis for that assertion. 
  
editor for various United States-based Hungarian publications, 
and has hosted a weekly radio program in New York City on 
Hungarian affairs. 
 In 1982, the government interviewed Koreh regarding his 
activities in Hungary during World War II.  At that time, Koreh 
told the government about his position with Szekely Nep during 
1941-42, his subsequent position with Világlap, and his charge 
and conviction for war crimes in the People's Court of Hungary.  
Koreh had not revealed this information at the time he applied 
for his visa. 
   In June 1989, the United States filed a nine-count 
complaint against Koreh, later expanded to ten counts, seeking to 
revoke Koreh's naturalized citizenship pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a), inter alia, as "illegally procured" on the basis of an 
invalid DPA visa.  The five counts relevant to this appeal allege 
that Koreh's DPA visa was invalid because (Count I) he had 
"assisted in the persecution" of Jews through his position at 
Szekely Nep, a fact which rendered Koreh ineligible for a visa 
under section 2(b) of the DPA; (Count II) he had "advocated 
and/or assisted in the persecution" of Jews through his position 
at Szekely Nep, a fact which rendered him ineligible for a visa 
under section 13 of the DPA; (Count III) he had been a member of 
or participated in "a movement hostile to the United States" 
through his employment as a Press Officer in the Press Department 
of the Hungarian Ministry of Propaganda in 1944, a fact which 
  
rendered him ineligible for a visa under section 13 of the DPA; 
(Count IV) his employment with the Hungarian Ministry constituted 
"voluntary assistance" to enemy forces in their operations 
against the United Nations and he was therefore not a "concern of 
the International Refugee Organization," a fact which rendered 
Koreh ineligible for a visa under section 2(b) of the DPA; (Count 
X) he was a war criminal and was therefore not a "concern of the 
International Refugee Organization," a fact which rendered Koreh 
ineligible for a visa under section 2(b) of the DPA.5 
 The government's motion for summary judgment was based 
on those five counts and argued that the undisputed facts in the 
case supported the conclusion that Koreh illegally procured his 
citizenship.  After hearing oral argument on the government's 
motion, the district court entered an order granting summary 
                     
5
.  In the remaining counts of the complaint, the government 
alleged (Count V) that Koreh's DPA visa was invalid under section 
10 of the DPA because Koreh had advocated or acquiesced in 
activities contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf 
of the Axis nations during World War II; (Count VI) that Koreh 
unlawfully entered the United States by making willful 
misrepresentations to the Displaced Persons Commission and the 
United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps for the purpose of 
obtaining admission; (Count VII) that Koreh gave false testimony 
to Naturalization examiners and therefore was not a person of 
good moral character as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), and was 
therefore ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 
1427(a)(3); (Count VIII) that Koreh's assistance in and advocacy 
of persecution of Jewish civilians in Hungary demonstrated that 
he was a not a person of good moral character and was therefore 
ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); and 
(Count IX) that Koreh illegally procured his citizenship by 
willfully concealing and misrepresenting material facts in his 
Application to File Petition for Naturalization and in his 
Petition for Naturalization. 
  
judgment to the government on Counts I, II and III of the 
complaint.  The district court concluded that Koreh's activities 
at Szekely Nep constituted "advocacy and assistance in 
persecution" rendering him ineligible for a DPA visa under both 
section 2(b) and section 13 of the DPA.  With respect to count 
III, the district court concluded that Koreh's activities at 
Szekely Nep constituted membership and participation in a 
"movement hostile to the United States," rendering him ineligible 
for a visa under section 13 of the DPA.  Because it held that 
these three counts were sufficient to support the government's 
denaturalization action, the district court declined to address 
the arguments presented by the government based on counts IV or 
X.  Koreh now appeals the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to this court.   
 II. 
 Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 This court has jurisdiction over Koreh's appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We have plenary review over the 
district court's order granting summary judgment.  Erie 
Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 We have previously noted the "two competing concerns" 
at issue in denaturalization cases, United States v. Breyer, 41 
F.3d 884, 889 (3d Cir. 1994), which have an impact on our review.  
As acknowledged by the Supreme Court, "the right to acquire 
  
American citizenship is a precious one, and . . . once 
citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and 
unsettling consequences."  Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 
490, 505 (1981).  Thus, the government "carries a heavy burden of 
proof in a proceeding to divest a naturalized citizen of his 
citizenship."  Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 
(1961).  At the same time, however, courts require "strict 
compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to 
the acquisition of citizenship."  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506.  
These two factors combine to "reflect our consistent recognition 
of the importance of the issues at stake--for the citizen as well 




 Under Section 340(a) of the Immigration & Nationality 
Act of 1952, as amended, the government may seek the revocation 
of an order admitting a person to citizenship and the 
cancellation of that person's certificate of naturalization if 
such order and certificate "were illegally procured."  8 U.S.C § 
1451(a).  In order to legally obtain a naturalization order and 
certificate, an applicant must have resided in the United States 
for at least five years after having been "lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence."  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a)(1), 1429.  Lawful 
admission requires entry pursuant to a valid immigrant visa.  See 
  
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 515; Breyer, 41 F.3d at 889; United States 
v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1985) (in banc), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986). 
 As noted above, Koreh entered the United States under a 
visa issued pursuant to the DPA.  At the time of Koreh's 
application, a DPA visa was available only to persons of concern 
to the International Refugee Organization (IRO).  DPA § 2(b), 62 
Stat. at 1009.  The IRO Constitution provided that persons "who 
can be shown to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil 
populations of countries" are not persons "of concern" to the 
IRO.  See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, 
opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 3051-52, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1846. 
 In addition, section 13 of the DPA provided, in part: 
 No visas shall be issued under the provisions of this 
Act . . . to any person who is or has been a member of 
or participant in any movement hostile to the United 
States or the form of government of the United States, 
or to any person who advocated or assisted in the 
persecution of any person because of race, religion, or 
natural origin. 
 
DPA § 13, 64 Stat. at 227 (emphasis added).  Thus, Koreh was not 
eligible for his DPA visa if, prior to his obtaining the visa, he 
(1) had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of 
countries" within the meaning of the IRO Constitution, (2) had 
"advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because 
of race, religion, or natural origin" within the meaning of 
section 13 of the DPA, or (3) was or had been "a member of or 
  
participant in a movement hostile to the United States or the 
form of government of the United States," within the meaning of 
section 13 of the DPA.  
 A. 
 Assistance in Persecution  
 We first consider whether the undisputed facts support 
the district court's conclusion that Koreh "assisted in the 
persecution" of Hungarian Jews through his activities at Szekely 
Nep.6  In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 
the term "assistance in persecution" with respect to the validity 
of a visa obtained under the DPA.  The Court held that an 
individual's service as a concentration camp guard constituted 
"assistance in persecution" even if that service was involuntary.  
Id. at 512-13 n.34.  The Court recognized that "[o]ther cases may 
present more difficult line-drawing problems," and suggested that 
the proper focus is "on whether particular conduct can be 
considered assisting in the persecution of civilians."  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  It continued: 
                     
6
.  In this case, the district court saw no significant 
difference between the phrases "to have assisted the enemy in 
persecuting civil populations of countries" under the IRO 
Constitution and "assisted in the persecution of any person 
because of race, religion, or natural origin" under section 13 of 
the DPA.  See United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 890 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (noting similar purpose behind the two provisions).  
We agree that these two standards have the same meaning for the 
purposes of this case.  We note, however, that section 13 also 
barred the issuance of a DPA visa to persons who "advocated" 
persecution.  As discussed below, this "advocacy" standard 
provides an independent basis for affirming the district court's 
order. 
  
  Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the 
hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot 
be found to have assisted in the persecution of 
civilians.  On the other hand, there can be no question 
that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a 
rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was 
regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to 
visit a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at 
escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the 
camp, fits within the statutory language about persons 
who assisted in the persecution of civilians. 
 
Id.   
 We have read Fedorenko as describing a "continuum of 
conduct to guide the courts in deciding" how to apply the term 
"assistance in persecution."  Breyer, 41 F.3d at 890.  Thus, the 
term is to be applied on a case-by-case basis with reference to 
the relevant facts presented in each case.  
 In his brief, Koreh suggests that the mere publication 
of anti-Semitic articles in a private newspaper cannot constitute 
"assistance in persecution."  In particular, Koreh states that he 
"challenge[s] the premise that propaganda assists persecution 
merely by creating 'a climate of opinion.'"  Appellant's Brief at 
47.  He contends that the district court's conclusion that the 
publication of such propaganda necessarily assisted persecution 
of Hungarian Jews is based upon a theory of causation 
questionable under both tort and criminal law.   
 In making such a contention, Koreh overlooks that this 
case is not founded on causation theories of either tort or 
criminal law.  The only issue is whether Koreh had satisfied the 
congressionally-imposed prerequisites for acquiring citizenship. 
  
 In any event, we unequivocally reject Koreh's 
contention that the propaganda activities of Szekely Nep did not 
"assist in the persecution" of Hungarian Jews.  It runs counter 
to generations of history that attest to the maxim that the pen 
is at least as mighty, if not mightier, than the sword.  That the 
Nazi powers, and their cohorts, placed great confidence in the 
power of the word is demonstrated by the emphasis they placed on 
propaganda.  Indeed, in the Nuremberg trials in presenting the 
charges against defendant Julius Streicher, publisher of an anti-
Semitic newspaper, the prosecution stated: 
 
  It may be that this defendant is less directly 
involved in the physical commission of crimes 
against Jews.  The submission of the prosecution 
is that his crime is no less the worse for that 
reason.  No government in the world, before the 
Nazis came to power, could have embarked upon and 
put into effect a policy of mass extermination 
without having a people who would back them and 
support them.  It was to the task of educating 
people, of producing murderers, educating and 
poisoning them with hate, that Streicher set 
himself.  In the early days he was preaching 
persecution.  As persecution took place he 
preached extermination and annihilation; and, as 
we have seen in the ghettos of the East, as 
millions of Jews were being exterminated and 
annihilated, he cried out for more and more. 
 
    That is the crime that he has committed.  It is 
the submission of the prosecution that he made 
these things possible--made these crimes possible-
-which could never have happened had it not been 
for him and for those like him. . . .  The effect 
of this man's crimes, of the poison that he has 
injected into the minds of millions and millions 
of young boys and girls and young men and women 
lives on.  He leaves behind him a legacy of almost 
  
a whole people poisoned with hate, sadism, and 
murder, and perverted by him. 
 
Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg 384-85 (1983)(emphasis 
added)(quoting from 5 International Military Tribunals (IMT), 
Trial of the Major War Criminals 118 (1987)). 
 When judgment was pronounced on Streicher, the War 
Crimes Court stated, "[T]his defendant continued to write and 
publish his propaganda of death.  Streicher's incitement to 
murder and extermination at the time when the Jews in the East 
were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly 
constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in 
connection with war crimes, and constitutes a Crime Against 
Humanity."  Id. at 496 (quoting from 1 IMT 304) (emphasis added).  
Although the underlying legal basis for the prosecution of 
Streicher differed from the basis for this denaturalization case 
against Koreh, the recognition of the nexus between propaganda 
and persecution is no less applicable for that reason.  
 In United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988), a case in which the 
court upheld an order of denaturalization because of the 
defendant's propaganda activities in writing pro-Nazi and anti-
Allies articles, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that such propaganda activities clearly constituted advocating or 
assisting "in the persecution of the Jews within the meaning of 
section 13 of the DPA."  Id. at 874.  The court noted that 
Webster's Dictionary defines "'persecution'" as "'the infliction 
  
of sufferings, harm, or death on those who differ . . . in a way 
regarded as offensive or meriting extirpation'" and as "'a 
campaign having for its object the subjugation or extirpation of 
the adherents of a religion.'"  Id.  The court stated that 
notwithstanding the lack of any showing of actual persecution of 
Jews resulting from Sokolov's articles, "such propaganda does 
assist persecution by creating a climate of opinion in which such 
persecution was acceptable," id., thereby facilitating their 
persecution.  Thus it concluded that Sokolov, who had written 
several anti-Semitic articles in German-occupied Russia, 
"assisted persecution" by conditioning the Russian people into 
accepting and carrying out the German anti-Jewish policies.  Id. 
 The Sokolov court's analysis is apt here.  There is 
evidence that Szekely Nep played a prominent role in calling for 
Hungary's adoption of increasingly drastic anti-Jewish 
restrictions.  During Koreh's tenure, Szekely Nep frequently 
advocated anti-Semitic legislation and enforcement actions that 
were more severe than those which had already been enacted by the 
Hungarian Parliament.  Some of the measures supported by Szekely 
Nep during 1941 and 1942 were eventually enacted when the German 
government occupied Hungary in 1944.  
 There was ample basis in the undisputed facts for the 
district court to conclude that Koreh's involvement in the 
publication of anti-Semitic articles by Szekely Nep assisted in 
the persecution of Hungarian Jews by fostering a climate of anti-
  
Semitism in Northern Transylvania which conditioned the Hungarian 
public to acquiesce, to encourage, and to carry out the 
abominable anti-Semitic policies of the Hungarian government in 
the early 1940s. 
 B. 
 Advocacy of Persecution 
 Moreover, we note that under section 13 of the DPA 
Koreh was ineligible for a visa if he "advocated or assisted in 
the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or 
natural origin."  See 64 Stat. at 227 (emphasis added).  Such 
advocacy by Koreh provides an independent basis to affirm the 
district court's order of denaturalization.   
 There can be no dispute that the articles published in 
Szekely Nep during Koreh's tenure advocated the persecution of 
Hungarian Jews.  Thus, even if Koreh were able to demonstrate 
that no actual persecution was caused by the articles published 
in Szekely Nep, he would still have been ineligible for a DPA 
visa under section 13 as in Sokolov for having advocated such 
persecution in the pages of Szekely Nep.  Koreh does not contest 
that principle of law nor does he deny that Szekely Nep advocated 
such persecution.  Instead he seeks to deflect the legal effect 
of the district court's factual and legal conclusions by 
disclaiming personal responsibility. 
  C. 
 The "active and personal participation" argument 
  
 Koreh's effort to avoid the inevitable conclusion to 
which the undisputed facts led the district court is principally 
concentrated in his argument that he "did not actively or 
personally commit any acts of oppression."  Appellant's Brief at 
22.  The difficulty with Koreh's argument is that it would 
require us to rewrite the statute. 
 Koreh contends that in non-death camp cases courts 
should require a showing that a defendant personally participated 
in the acts of persecution.  He notes that while courts have 
frequently found that armed concentration camp guards have 
"assisted in persecution" regardless of whether they personally 
committed any acts of oppression, see, e.g., Breyer, 41 F.3d at 
890; United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991), they have been reluctant to 
apply a similar standard in non-death camp cases.  Thus, Koreh 
reasons, even if the anti-Semitic articles in Szekely Nep 
constitute "advocacy or assistance in persecution" of Hungarian 
Jews, the government must still demonstrate that he took an 
active role in the publication of those articles.   
 In support of his argument, Koreh relies heavily on 
United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985).  In 
Sprogis, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 
district court's dismissal of the government's denaturalization 
action on the ground that the government had presented 
insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the 
  
defendant had assisted in the persecution of Jews while serving 
as a policeman in Nazi-controlled Latvia.  The court stated that 
although the defendant had been present at the police station 
during the detention of nine Latvian Jews and had allowed their 
incarceration to continue, "these were not acts of oppression." 
Id. at 122.  The Sprogis court continued: 
 There is no clear evidence that he made any decision to 
single out any person for arrest and persecution or 
that he committed any hostile act against any 
persecuted civilian.  Sprogis' passive accommodation of 
the Nazis, like that of so many other civil servants 
similarly faced with the Nazis' conquest of their 
homelands and the horrors of World War II, does not, in 
our view, exclude him from citizenship under the DPA.  
To hold otherwise would require the condemnation as 
persecutors of all those who, with virtually no 
alternative, performed routine law enforcement 
functions during Nazi occupation. 
 
Id. at 122-23. 
 While we might have drawn the line between "passive 
accommodation" and "assistance in persecution" differently than 
did the Sprogis court, we note that in a case shortly thereafter, 
Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 
U.S. 1182 (1986), the same court sustained deportation of a 
former Latvian police chief who, on orders of the German 
authorities, had directed his police to assist the German 
soldiers in mass arrests and the burning of a village.  Id. at 
438.  The court did not cite its own Sprogis decision decided 
earlier the same year.7 
                     
7
.  The government argues, and the district court agreed, that 
Sprogis is not good law because the Second Circuit's decision in 
  
 The language in other denaturalization cases on which 
Koreh relies for his proposed "personal participation" 
requirement provides little persuasive precedent.  In United 
States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 
U.S. 1153 (1986), the court affirmed a district court's order 
revoking the citizenship of a defendant who served as an armed 
guard at a Nazi labor camp in Poland.  Thus the statement that 
"in cases not involving armed guards such as defendant, a showing 
of personal involvement in persecutions may be necessary," id. at 
1378 (emphasis added), is not only dictum, but equivocal dictum 
at best.   
 Inexplicably, Koreh continuously refers to language in 
the dissenting opinion in United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 
488, 513 (3d Cir. 1985) (in banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 
(1986).  This court, in banc, affirmed the order of 
denaturalization, concluding that the defendant was ineligible 
for a DPA visa because (1) he had voluntarily assisted enemy 
forces during World War II in their operations, and (2) he made 
willful material misrepresentations in his application for a DPA 
(..continued) 
United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864, 874 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988) effectively rejected Sprogis.  Koreh 
responds that because Sokolov "voluntarily wrote anti-Semitic 
articles," his role was different from Sprogis's role of "passive 
accommodation."  We need not decide whether the cases are 
consistent because Koreh's conduct was more analogous to 
Sokolov's and, in any event, we find the analysis in Sokolov more 
persuasive. 
  
visa.  Id. at 498.  Had this court been persuaded by the 
dissent's view, patently the outcome would have been different. 
 This is not a case in which the government bases its 
claim of "assistance in or advocacy of" persecution on Koreh's 
mere membership in an organization.  Thus again, the language in 
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985), where the court 
stated that under the Holtzman Amendment8 the government must 
"provide proof of personal active assistance or participation in 
persecutorial acts before deportability may be established" 
rather than "mere acquiescence or membership in an organization," 
id. at 1431-32, was not made in a factually analogous situation.  
The same is true of the dictum in Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 446, 
where the court did uphold deportability, and in its discussion 
merely noted that "an alien's inactive membership in an 
organization bent on politically-based persecution" or "his 
tangential provision of services to such an organization" might 
be insufficient to support deportation. 
 Indeed, there is also dictum on Koreh's "personal 
participation" argument that goes in the other direction.  For 
example, in Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987), another Holtzman Amendment case 
                     
8
.  The Holtzman Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
permits deportation of any alien who, under the direction of or 
in association with the Nazi regime or any regime allied with it, 
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person because of race, religion, national 
origin, or political opinion."  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i). 
  
upholding deportability, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected 
the requirement that personal, active involvement in the 
persecution is required to constitute "assistance in 
persecution."  The Schellong court noted that insofar as Sprogis 
and Laipenieks hold "that personal involvement in atrocities is 
necessary to have assisted in persecution for purposes of the DPA 
or the Holtzman Amendment, they conflict with Fedorenko."  Id. at 
661.  The Schellong court, as did this court in Breyer, 41 F.3d 
at 890, and the Second Circuit in Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 446-48, 
endorsed a more flexible rule, determining the nature of 
"assistance in persecution" on a case-by-case basis, as suggested 
in Fedorenko.  See 449 U.S. at 512-13 n.34. 
 In any event, the only issue before us is whether the 
facts of this case support the conclusion that Koreh assisted in 
or advocated persecution of the Jews, the statutory standard.   
There need be no personal participation by the defendant in the 
commission of physical atrocities. 
 Despite Koreh's contentions to the contrary, the 
undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Koreh did, in 
fact, personally participate in the activities that are the 
subject of the government's denaturalization claim.  While the 
issue of Koreh's involvement in the editorial process at Szekely 
Nep remains in dispute, there is no dispute that Koreh sought and 
obtained from the Hungarian government the license to publish 
Szekely Nep.  That license, as Koreh concedes, was necessary 
  
under Hungarian law to permit the newspaper to publish.  Indeed, 
his act of obtaining and maintaining the license for Szekely Nep 
enabled the publication of the newspaper to occur and ensured 
that its anti-Semitic message would be carried throughout its 
distribution area in Northern Transylvania.  Koreh's actions in 
connection with the newspaper therefore cannot fairly be 
characterized as one of "passive accommodation."  Rather, Koreh 
took affirmative acts that were no less influential to the spread 
of Szekely Nep's anti-Semitic message than the actions of those 
who personally edited and wrote the articles that appeared in the 
newspaper.  Thus, even if we were to require some degree of 
active personal participation from defendants in non-death camp 
cases, Koreh's undisputed actions in this case would satisfy that 
requirement.  It would be ironic indeed were we to hold that some 
mere writer were to have responsibility for the contents of the 
propaganda spewed out month after month by Szekely Nep but that 
someone without whom the paper could not be published can evade 
such responsibility.  It is simply unacceptable to equate Koreh's 
responsibility with that of a typesetter, as Koreh's counsel 
sought to do at argument. 
 We conclude that the undisputed facts of this case 
demonstrate that Koreh's activities at Szekely Nep during 1941 
and 1942 constituted both assistance in the persecution of 
civilians under the IRO and the "advoca[cy] or assist[ance] in 
the persecution of any persons because of race, religion, or 
  
national origin" under section 13 of the DPA.  Koreh was 
therefore ineligible for a DPA visa, and his citizenship was thus 
"illegally procured" under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).   
 D. 
 Movement Hostile 
 As an alternate basis for its grant of summary 
judgment, the district court determined that Koreh was also 
ineligible for a visa under section 13 of the DPA because his 
activities at Szekely Nep constituted membership and 
participation in a "movement hostile to the United States."  As 
precedent, the district court relied on two cases.  One was the 
Second Circuit's holding in Sokolov that Sokolov's writing anti-
Semitic articles "amounted to a participation in a 'movement . . 
. hostile to the United States.'"  See 814 F.2d at 874.  The 
other was the district court's holding in Marschalko v. 
Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 63-138 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1951), App. at 
1775-86, approving the INS's conclusion that an individual who 
had been a writer for a semi-official publication of the 
Hungarian government during the war, and who wrote anti-American, 
anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi articles, was ineligible for a DPA visa 
because he had "participated in a movement. . . which was 
'hostile to the United States.'"  App. at 1786. 
 Although the word "movement" may not ordinarily be 
associated with a newspaper, Koreh's argument does not stand on 
that technical ground, and the application of the word for 
  
purposes of the relevant statute has been broad.  Koreh argues 
instead that unlike the newspapers in Sokolov and Marschalko, 
which were directly affiliated with Axis governments,9 Szekely 
Nep was a "civilian newspaper" and therefore it should not be 
deemed a "movement hostile to the United States" despite its 
anti-Allies political stance.10    
 However, the premise for the government's 
denaturalization claim is that Koreh was not eligible for DPA 
status, which was the basis of his visa.  The government has 
produced uncontested evidence that during the early 1950s, when 
Koreh got his visa, the United States Displaced Persons 
Commission (DPC) frequently denied DPA status to persons 
associated with private and semi-private newspapers that had 
published anti-American propaganda in Axis nations during World 
War II because they were deemed members of movements "hostile to 
the United States."  See, e.g., App. at 1613 (denying admission 
to editor of newspaper in Hungary during 1942 because "[t]he 
position . . . would necessitate support and compliance with the 
                     
9
.  In Sokolov, the paper was a publication directly controlled 
and operated by the German army.  814 F.2d at 867.  In 
Marschalko, the paper was characterized as a "semi-official organ 
of the Hungarian government."  App. at 1778.   
10
.  In light of the articles referred to in the text supra, 
Koreh does not dispute, nor could he, that Szekely Nep espoused 
anti-American views and pro-Nazi philosophy during Koreh's 
tenure.  See, e.g., App. at 1195-1204 (article entitled 
"Roosevelt-The Emperor of the World"); App. at 1327-35 (article 
entitled "How the World's Jews Forced the American People to Go 
to War").   
  
directives of the Hungarian Government in power in 1942"); App. 
at 1614 (denying admission to person who admitted association 
with newspaper published under Nazi supervision that demonstrated 
"pro-Nazi sentiment"); App. at 1615 (denying admission to woman 
whose husband was editor-in-chief of rightist German newspaper 
and wrote anti-Allies and anti-Jewish articles in Hungarian 
newspaper).   
 This evidence clearly supports the government's 
position, accepted by the district court, that Szekely Nep 
constituted a "movement hostile to the United States" for DPA 
purposes.11  The DPC decisions demonstrate that the DPC's focus 
was on the sentiment expressed in the newspapers, not the formal 
institutional association of the newspaper.  Insofar as the DPC 
decisions suggest that some connection with an Axis government is 
required, see, e.g., App. at 1614, the record shows both that 
Szekely Nep received some degree of editorial direction from the 
Hungarian government and that Szekely Nep could not have operated 
without a government license.  We therefore conclude that Szekely 
Nep constituted a "movement hostile to the United States" for the 
purposes of section 13 of the DPA.  
 We must then consider Koreh's attempt to distinguish 
Sokolov and Marschalko on the ground that those defendants 
                     
11
.  Of course, the DPC decisions are not dispositive of our 
interpretation of the "movement hostile" language.  Instead they 
undermine Koreh's suggestion that for DPA status there was a 
clear distinction between private and public newspapers which 
published anti-American, pro-Nazi articles.   
  
personally advocated Nazism or anti-Semitism by writing articles 
in official or semi-official newspapers.  He argues, as he did in 
connection with the "assistance" and "advocacy" grounds for 
denaturalization, that the degree of his personal involvement in 
the publication process is a disputed issue of material fact.  
Koreh contends that "participation or membership" must be 
construed to take into account the degree of a defendant's 
involvement in the organization, in order that those tangentially 
affiliated with a movement deemed hostile to the United States 
(such as a janitor, a sportswriter, etc.) would not be barred by 
section 13.   
 In most cases involving the "movement hostile" prong of 
the DPA, there is little question that the defendant participated 
actively in actions deemed hostile to the United States.  See, 
e.g., Breyer, 41 F.3d at 890-91 (defendant's voluntary service in 
Nazi concentration camp guard unit constituted membership in a 
movement hostile to the United States); Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 
497 n.11 (suggesting that defendant's voluntary service in 
Ukrainian militia organized by the Nazis constituted membership 
in a movement hostile to the United States).  That does not mean 
that those whose actions were of a different order do not also 
fall within the statutory prescription. 
 We find particularly persuasive the decision of Judge 
Bechtle in United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 
1981) that "membership in a movement hostile to the United 
  
States" required only willing membership in such an organization 
"without proof of personal participation in acts of persecution."  
Id. at 72.  As that court pointed out, the plain language of 
section 13 contains no requirement that a defendant personally 
participate in any hostile acts committed by the movement, and 
the legislative history suggests that Congress sought to exclude 
all "members" of such groups, regardless of the degree of their 
participation.  Id. at 73-75.  This led it to conclude that 
"[t]he only qualifying restriction as to willing membership does 
not go to the type or personal degree of membership but, rather, 
to the type of movement in which a person is a member."  Id. at 
74.12  It is unlikely that Congress, which enacted the DPA in 
part to assist the victims of Nazi persecution, wanted to extend 
the DPA's benefits to persons who were voluntary members of 
movements that assisted in that persecution.13 
 There is no dispute that Koreh voluntarily assumed the 
position as Responsible Editor of Szekely Nep.  In light of our 
                     
12
.  Relying upon this conclusion, the Osidach court concluded 
that an individual who was a voluntary member of the Ukrainian 
police from 1942-44 was a member of a movement hostile to the 
United States because those police assisted the Germans during 
the war, regardless of whether he personally participated in any 
acts of persecution.  513 F. Supp. at 78-79, 96.   
13
.  While no courts have directly addressed the issue, at least 
one other court of appeals has implicitly accepted the Osidach 
court's interpretation of the provision.  See Laipenieks v. INS, 
750 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that in a deportation 
action, unlike a denaturalization action involving the DPA, "more 
than willing membership in a movement is required to establish 
deportability"). 
  
conclusion that the newspaper constituted a "movement hostile to 
the United States," we will also affirm the district court's 
conclusion that Koreh was ineligible for a visa under the 
"movement hostile" provision of section 13 of the DPA.14 
 E. 
  Laches 
 Koreh unsuccessfully argued that the government's claim 
was barred by laches because it was investigating this case in 
1982 but failed to file a complaint until 1989.  The elements of 
laches are (1) lack of diligence by party against whom the 
defense is asserted and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the 
defense.  Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 74 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  Koreh apparently contends that the delay in bringing 
the denaturalization action was inexcusable, and that he suffered 
prejudice due to the delay.  
 The government argues that laches is unavailable in a 
denaturalization proceeding and that its use as a defense in such 
a case is unprecedented.  This court has not yet decided that 
issue.  In Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961), 
                     
14
.  We note that the district court's conclusion on this issue 
could also be affirmed by relying upon the alternative grounds 
advanced by the government: Koreh's position in the Information 
Section of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of National Defense and 
Propaganda during 1943-44.  Koreh does not dispute that he 
voluntarily assumed this governmental position, and there is 
little question that the Ministry, as an organ of the Hungarian 
Axis government during World War II, constituted a "movement 
hostile to the United States" for the purposes of section 13 of 
the DPA.  Because there are ample other bases to affirm, we need 
not rely on a ground not reached by the district court. 
  
the Supreme Court acknowledged that some federal courts have held 
that "laches is not a defense against the sovereign," but because 
the Court concluded that the laches claim in that case would fail 
on its merits, it did not decide whether the defense was 
applicable in a denaturalization proceeding.  Id. at 282-84. 
 The government points to Fedorenko, a later case, where 
the Supreme Court noted that "district courts lack equitable 
discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of 
denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship 
was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation of 
material facts."  449 U.S. at 517.  Although the Fedorenko Court 
was not discussing the availability of a laches defense, the 
government reasons that this language bars such a defense because 
laches involves the use of a district court's "equitable 
discretion."  The government also cites several decisions by 
federal district courts holding that a laches defense is not 
available in a denaturalization proceeding.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Schmidt, No. 88 C 9475, 1990 WL 6667, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 3, 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 921 (1991); United States v. Schuk, 565 F. Supp. 613, 615 
(E.D. Pa. 1983); see also United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 
1254, 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374, 1384 (7th 
Cir.) (noting on appeal that the court need not reach the issue 
because the defendant did not meet the burden of proving laches), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986). 
  
 Under the facts of this case, we need not resolve the 
question of the availability of a laches defense to a 
denaturalization action.  We agree with the district court that 
even if such a defense were available, Koreh has failed to 
establish the elements required to maintain the defense.  A party 
asserting the defense of laches has the burden of establishing 
the elements of the defense.  See EEOC v. Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co., 735 U.S. 69, 80 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 
U.S. 925 (1984).  Koreh has not shown that he has suffered any 
specific prejudice from the government's alleged lack of 
diligence in bringing the case.   
 While Koreh makes a blanket assertion that the delay 
has resulted in the loss of potential witnesses due to death, he 
does not identify any individual who might have helped his 
defense.  Indeed, as discussed above, because Koreh has admitted 
that he obtained and maintained the license to publish Szekely 
Nep, an action which we find sufficient to support the conclusion 
that he personally participated in the newspaper's anti-Semitic 
advocacy and assistance in persecution, it is difficult to see 
how any additional testimony would aid in his defense. 
 We therefore conclude that the district court did not 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the district court. 
 
  
 
 
